[Xenomai] RTDM serial illicit call from head domain 'Xenomai'

Steve Freyder steve at freyder.net
Sat May 12 23:53:02 CEST 2018


Greetings again,

Xenomai 3.0.6, armv7, imx6, imx_uart rtdm driver

I've seen many postings about this, and about symbol wrapping, etc, 
etc.  I'm still
not understanding something very basic here, I'm sure.

When I run a program built with --alchemy (no --posix) skin, and I 
execute these lines
of code (error checking is omitted here but being done in the real 
program and not failing):

#define SER_BAUD        9600            /**< Baud rate for SYNC interface */
#define SYNC_DEVICE     "rtser0"        /**< serial device used for SYNC */

static const struct rtser_config sync_config = {
         .config_mask       = 0xFFFF,
         .baud_rate         = SER_BAUD,
         .parity            = RTSER_NO_PARITY,
         .data_bits         = RTSER_8_BITS,
         .stop_bits         = RTSER_1_STOPB,
         .handshake         = RTSER_NO_HAND,
         .fifo_depth        = RTSER_FIFO_DEPTH_1,
         .rx_timeout        = RTSER_TIMEOUT_NONE,
         .tx_timeout        = 1e9,
         .event_timeout     = 1e9,
         .timestamp_history = RTSER_DEF_TIMESTAMP_HISTORY,
         .event_mask        = RTSER_EVENT_RXPEND,
};

fd = __RT(open)(SYNC_DEVICE,0) ;

     err = __RT(ioctl)(fd, RTSER_RTIOC_SET_CONFIG, &sync_config);

I get this traceback (once only per system boot):

------------------------------------------------------------------------
[  411.088376] I-pipe: Detected illicit call from head domain 'Xenomai'
[  411.088376]         into a regular Linux service
[  411.100666] CPU: 1 PID: 875 Comm: rtserE Not tainted 
4.1.18_C01571-15S00-00.000.zimg+83fdace666 #1
[  411.109644] Hardware name: Freescale i.MX6 Quad/DualLite (Device Tree)
[  411.116189] Backtrace:
[  411.118694] [<80014a64>] (dump_backtrace) from [<80014c9c>] 
(show_stack+0x20/0x24)
[  411.126280]  r7:00000000 r6:00000080 r5:00000000 r4:80b81c94
[  411.132072] [<80014c7c>] (show_stack) from [<806b5f3c>] 
(dump_stack+0xa0/0xc4)
[  411.139326] [<806b5e9c>] (dump_stack) from [<800ab000>] 
(ipipe_root_only+0x11c/0x188)
[  411.147171]  r9:80c58300 r8:00000000 r7:80c45380 r6:80b34e6c 
r5:600d0013 r4:809abba4
[  411.155073] [<800aaee4>] (ipipe_root_only) from [<8001f5ac>] 
(ipipe_test_and_stall_root+0x18/0xc0)
[  411.164046]  r10:bc5c0024 r9:00000000 r8:40480201 r7:00000005 
r6:00002580 r5:80bc154c
[  411.172023]  r4:80ba5c9c r3:00000000
[  411.175675] [<8001f594>] (ipipe_test_and_stall_root) from 
[<806b8274>] (mutex_trylock+0x40/0x1ec)
[  411.184561]  r7:00000005 r6:00002580 r5:80bc154c r4:80ba5c9c
[  411.190358] [<806b8234>] (mutex_trylock) from [<80580d78>] 
(clk_prepare_lock+0x1c/0xfc)
[  411.198376]  r7:00000005 r6:00002580 r5:bece7e50 r4:bec36480
[  411.204164] [<80580d5c>] (clk_prepare_lock) from [<80581e8c>] 
(clk_core_get_rate+0x1c/0x70)
[  411.212530]  r5:bece7e50 r4:bec36480
[  411.216180] [<80581e70>] (clk_core_get_rate) from [<80581f04>] 
(clk_get_rate+0x24/0x28)
[  411.224198]  r5:bece7e50 r4:bc5c2000
[  411.227863] [<80581ee0>] (clk_get_rate) from [<7f08d2c4>] 
(rt_imx_uart_ioctl+0xa88/0xe5c [xeno_imx_uart])
[  411.237464] [<7f08c83c>] (rt_imx_uart_ioctl [xeno_imx_uart]) from 
[<8010779c>] (rtdm_fd_ioctl+0xc0/0x218)
[  411.247048]  r10:00011638 r9:00000000 r8:40480201 r7:00000005 
r6:bc5c0000 r5:600d0013
[  411.255025]  r4:80c58300
[  411.257609] [<801076e0>] (rtdm_fd_ioctl) from [<8010dc70>] 
(CoBaLt_ioctl+0x18/0x1c)
[  411.265280]  r3:00011638 r2:00011638 r1:40480201
[  411.269989]  r10:bf648800 r9:c0943008 r8:8010dc58 r7:80b34e6c 
r6:00000001 r5:00000052
[  411.277964]  r4:bece7fb0
[  411.280548] [<8010dc58>] (CoBaLt_ioctl) from [<8011efc4>] 
(ipipe_syscall_hook+0x174/0x380)
[  411.288839] [<8011ee50>] (ipipe_syscall_hook) from [<800ad6d8>] 
(__ipipe_notify_syscall+0xa4/0x3e0)
[  411.297899]  r10:bf648800 r9:80c45380 r8:80b34e6c r7:bf649800 
r6:80c45380 r5:00000001
[  411.305873]  r4:200d0013
[  411.308464] [<800ad634>] (__ipipe_notify_syscall) from [<80010868>] 
(pipeline_syscall+0x8/0x24)
[  411.317177]  r10:00000002 r9:bece6000 r8:80010928 r7:000f0042 
r6:00000005 r5:40480201
[  411.325153]  r4:00011638
------------------------------------------------------------------------

If I do not execute the ioctl call, and I instead call:

     err = __RT(write)(fd,"x",1) ;

I do not get the traceback, and the write is successful.  This tells me 
that ioctl() path
has some kind of check in it that the write() path doesn't have.  Is the 
detection of a
cross-domain call something that an RTDM driver is doing or is this 
something at a higher
level making these checks?

What's more, I've seen many comments that this is a problem scenario, 
and that it will put
the system into a "bad state".  But all of my testing says that this is 
completely benign
and everything is working as I expect it to.  It can't be both ways - 
which way is it, and
why?

Thanks in advance,
Steve




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